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Abstract: This paper is concerned with the event-based security control problem for a class
of discrete-time stochastic systems with multiplicative noises subject to both randomly occurring
Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks and randomly occurring deception attacks. An event-triggered
mechanism is adopted with hope to reduce the communication burden, where the measurement
signal is transmitted only when a certain triggering condition is violated. A novel attack model is
proposed to reflect the randomly occurring behaviors of the DoS attacks as well as the deception
attacks within a unified framework via two sets of Bernoulli distributed white sequences with
known conditional probabilities. A new concept of mean-square security domain is put forward
to quantify the security degree. We aim to design an output feedback controller such that the
closed-loop system achieves the desired security. By using the stochastic analysis techniques,
some sufficient conditions are established to guarantee the desired security requirement and the
control gain is obtained by solving some linear matrix inequalities with nonlinear constraints. A
simulation example is utilized to illustrate the usefulness of the proposed controller design scheme.
1. Introduction
It has been well recognized that some characteristics of nonlinear systems can be closely approx-
imated by models with multiplicative noises rather than by linearized models [1]. In the past few
decades, considerable research efforts have been made on the control issues for stochastic systems
with multiplicative noises (also called bilinear systems or systems with state-dependent noises) and
a rich body of literature has been available. Up to now, there have been mainly four approaches
that shed insightful lights on the control design of stochastic systems with multiplicative noises,
namely, the game-theoretic method [2], the linear matrix inequality (LMI) approach [3], the Riccati
equation approach [4, 5] and the optimization method [6].
Owing to the ever-increasing popularity of communication networks, more and more control
tasks are executed over communication links [7–13]. It should be mentioned that, in the interest
of energy saving, the traditional time-based control scheme might be a conservative choice. Ac-
cording to the engineering practice, when the limited resource becomes a concern, the following
three points should be taken into account when selecting communication protocols: 1) too frequent
data interaction via networks is likely to overspend the depletable bandwidth and thus deteriorate
communication quality; 2) it is often the case that only some vitally important measurement data
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should be transmitted for control/estimation purposes as long as the basic system performance can
be maintained; and 3) unnecessary communications between the system components in an energy-
limited environment (e.g. battery-operated wireless sensor networks) could lead to the waste of the
limited resource. In this case, it is theoretically significant and practically important to develop
some new control schemes that are capable of utilizing the network resource in an efficient way
when transmitting measurement or control information. In response to the engineering need for
emerge-saving, in the past few years, the event-based control issues have received much attention
from the control community. Some initial yet inspiring results have been reported in [14–18] for
the consensus control problems of multi-agent systems, in [19–22] for the sample-data control
problems, and in [23] for the model predictive control problems. Note that the main characteristics
of the event-based control scheme are that the control information is updated only when some func-
tion of the system state or measurement exceeds a certain threshold [24–26]. In comparison with
the widely used time-based control scheme, such an event-based scheme could effectively reduce
the communication burden and improve the resource utilization efficiency. As such, it makes prac-
tical sense to investigate the event-based control problem for stochastic systems with multiplicative
noises.
As is well known, sensors, controllers and controlled plants are often connected over a common
network medium for networked control systems (NCSs). In such an engineering setting, the ex-
changed data without security protection can be easily exploited by attackers (or adversaries) [27].
Nowadays, two types of attack models, namely, Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks and deception
attacks, are generally adopted in the performance analysis and synthesis when it comes to the se-
curity issue. It is worth noting that, by destroying certain significant data, the aim of the adversaries
is often to destabilize the plant or steer the plant to the adversaries’ expected operating point [28].
As such, the network security is of utmost importance in modern society that has been attracting
considerable attention in recent years. Up to now, some preliminary results have been reported in
the literature, see, e.g. [29–31] for the case of DoS attacks, [32,33] for the case of deception attacks
and [34, 35] for the case of replay attacks. Furthermore, for the attacked systems with protection
equipment or software, the attacks may occur in a random way since the successes of the attacks
are largely dependent on the network conditions (e.g. network load, network congestion, network
transmission rate) that are typically randomly fluctuated. Very recently, a Bernoulli process or
Markov process with known statistical information has been employed in [36] to govern the ran-
domly occurring DoS attacks. Nevertheless, the network-induced random nature of the deception
attacks has been largely overlooked due probably to the difficulty in coming up with appropriate
methodologies for the problem formulation and theoretical analysis. Furthermore, the attackers
could adopt any type of attack at a particular time in order to increase their successful ratio. There-
fore, to closely reflect the reality, it would be practically significant to look into the security issue
when both the DoS deception attacks occur randomly within a unified framework.
Summarizing the discussion above, it can be concluded that the security control problems have
attracted some initial research interest and most available results have been concerned with the
single type of attacks (e.g. either DoS attacks or deception attacks). So far, the security control
problem with both randomly occurring DoS attacks and randomly occurring deception attacks
has not been properly investigated, not to mention the case where the event-based communication
scheme is also utilized. It is, therefore, the purpose of this paper to shorten such a gap by examining
the impact of mixed network attacks on the system security under an event-based mechanism. This
appears to be a challenging task with two essential difficulties identified as follows: 1) how can we
establish a model to describe randomly occurring DoS attacks and randomly occurring deception
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attacks within a unified framework? 2) what kind of methods can be developed to quantify the
influences from both the random nature and the interference signals transmitted by adversaries on
the security performance?
In this paper, to handle the two identified challenges, an attack model is first proposed to simul-
taneously describe the randomly occurring DoS attacks and randomly occurring deception attacks
via two sets of Bernoulli distributed white sequences, and a new concept of mean-square securi-
ty domain is put forward to quantify the security degree. Then, by using the stochastic analysis
techniques, some sufficient conditions are established to guarantee the security requirement of the
addressed systems and the desired controller gain is obtained by solving certain linear matrix in-
equalities with nonlinear constraints. The main contribution of this paper is mainly threefold: 1)
A novel attack model is established to account for the randomly occurring behaviors of the DoS
attacks and the deception attacks; 2) the event-based mechanism is utilized to reduce the com-
munication burden; and 3) based on the proposed attack model, the controller gain is obtained
to ensure that the closed-loop system is secure with respect to the parameter set (δ1, δ2, δ3, δ4, R)
where each parameter does have its own engineering interpretation.
Notation The notation used here is fairly standard except where otherwise stated. Rn and
R
n×m denote, respectively, the n dimensional Euclidean space and the set of all n×m real matri-
ces. I denotes the identity matrix of compatible dimensions. The notation X ≥ Y (respectively,
X > Y ), where X and Y are symmetric matrices, means that X − Y is positive semi-definite
(respectively, positive definite). AT represents the transpose of A. λmax(A) and λmin(A) denote
the maximum and minimum eigenvalue of A, respectively. For matrices A ∈ Rm×n and B ∈ Rp×q,
their Kronecker product is a matrix in Rmp×nq denoted as A ⊗ B. E{x} stands for the expecta-
tion of the stochastic variable x. ||x|| describes the Euclidean norm of a vector x. The shorthand
diag{M1,M2, · · · ,Mn} denotes a block diagonal matrix with diagonal blocks being the matrices
M1, ...,Mn. In symmetric block matrices, the symbol ∗ is used as an ellipsis for terms induced by
symmetry.
2. Problem Formulation and Preliminaries
In this paper, consider the following discrete-time stochastic system with multiplicative noises in
both the system and measurement equations:

xk+1 =
(
A0 +
r∑
i=1
ωi,kAi
)
xk +Buk
y˜k =
(
C0 +
s∑
i=1
̟i,kCi
)
xk
(1)
where xk ∈ Rnx , y˜k ∈ Rny and uk ∈ Rnu are the state vector, the sensor measurement and the
controller input, respectively. Ai (i = 0, 1. · · · , r), B and Ci (i = 0, 1. · · · , s) are known constant
matrices with appropriate dimensions. ωi,k ∈ R (i = 1, 2, · · · , r) and ̟i,k ∈ R (i = 1, 2, · · · , s)
are multiplicative noises with zero means and unity variances, and are mutually uncorrelated in k
and i, r and s are known positive integers. It is assumed that the rank of B is nu.
In this paper, an event-triggered communication mechanism is taken into consideration in order
to reduce the communication burden. Define the event generator function ψ(·, ·) : Rny × R → R
as follows:
ψ(ek, δ) = e
T
k ek − δ21 (2)
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where
ek := y˜
t
ks − y˜k
with y˜tks being the transmitted information at the latest event instant and δ1 being a given positive
scalar. The executions are triggered as long as the condition
ψ(ek, δ1) > 0
is satisfied. Therefore, the sequence of event triggered instants
0 ≤ s0 < s1 < · · · < sl < · · ·
is determined iteratively by
sl+1 = inf{k ∈ N|k > sl, ψ(ek, δ1) > 0}.
Furthermore, it is assumed that the attackers only destroy the transmitted data and have the ability
to carry out both the Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks and the deception attacks with certain success
probabilities, in other words, both kinds of attack can be launched in a random way. To reflect such
a situation that is of practical significance, a new attack model is proposed as follows:
ytks = α
t
ks(y˜
t
ks + β
t
ksv
t
ks) + (1− αtks)ytks−1 (3)
where ytks is the register information on the controller and vtks ∈ Rny stands for the signals sent by
attackers. In addition, vtks is modeled as
vtks = −y˜tks + ξtks
for deception attacks where the non-zero ξtks satisfying
‖ξtks‖ ≤ δ2
is an arbitrary bounded energy signal. The stochastic variables αks and βks are Bernoulli distributed
white sequences taking values on 0 or 1 with the following probabilities
Prob{αks = 0} = 1− α¯, Prob{αks = 1} = α¯,
Prob{βks = 0} = 1− β¯, Prob{βks = 1} = β¯,
where α¯ ∈ [0, 1) and β¯ ∈ [0, 1) are two known constants.
Remark 1. Generally speaking, network attacks can be divided into the Denial-of-Service (DoS)
attacks and the deception attacks. For DoS attacks, the adversary prevents the controller from
receiving sensor measurements. For deception attacks, the adversary sends false information to
controllers. Due to the network-induced phenomena and the application of safety protection de-
vices, there is a nonzero probability for each attack launched via networks to be unsuccessful at
a certain time. The model proposed in (3) provides a novel unified framework to account for the
phenomena of both randomly occurring DoS attacks and randomly occurring deception attacks.
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Remark 2. Three cases can be observed from (3) as follows: a) the systems suffer from the
deception attacks when αtks = 1 and β
t
ks
= 1; b) the systems are subject to the DoS attacks when
αtks = 0 and the register information on controller cannot be updated in this case; and c) the
controller receives the normal sensor measurements when αtks = 1 and β
t
ks
= 0. Furthermore, it
is worth mentioning that Case a) (with ξtks = 0) describes the traditional phenomenon of packet
dropouts and Case b) can also reflect the time-delays. Therefore, the proposed attack model covers
time delays and packet dropouts as its special cases.
Remark 3. Due to limited energy, the adversaries could not arbitrarily launch the attacks and,
from the defenders’ perspective, the cyber-attack could be intermittent and the injected signal is
bounded. Furthermore, the injected signal sent by adversaries is a kind of invalid information to
achieve the control task and therefore it can be viewed as an energy bounded noise. The main
purpose of the present research is to improve the security by enhancing the insensitivity to certain
types of bounded and random cyber-attacks.
For k ∈ [ks, ks+1), the register information (3) can be rewritten as
yk = α
t
ks(y˜
t
ks + β
t
ksv
t
ks) + (1− αtks)yk−1 (4)
with yks = ytks . Furthermore, taking both the even-triggering condition and the attack bound into
consideration, and applying the output-feedback control
uk = Kyk
where K is the control parameter to be determined, one has the following closed-loop system
x˜k+1 = A1x˜k + (α¯− αtks)A2x˜k + ((αtks − α¯)− χks)A3x˜k
+A4,ksx˜k + α¯β¯A5ξtks + α¯(1− β¯)A5ek + χksA5ξtks + ((αtks − α¯)− χks)A5ek.
(5)
where
x˜k =
[
xTk y
T
k−1
]T
,
χks = (α
t
ks − α¯)β¯ + (βtks − β¯)α¯+ (αtks − α¯)(βtks − β¯)
A1 =
[
A0 + α¯(1− β¯)BKC0 (1− α¯)BK
α¯(1− β¯)C0 (1− α¯)I
]
,
A2 =
[
0 BK
0 I
]
, A3 =
[
BKC0 0
C0 0
]
, A5 =
[
BK
I
]
A4,ks =
[ ∑r
i=1 ωi,kAi + α
t
ks
(1− βtks)
∑s
i=1̟i,kBKCi 0
αtks(1− βtks)
∑s
i=1̟i,kCi 0
]
Remark 4. A schematic structure of the addressed control problem can be shown in Fig. 1. The
adversary can detect the transmitted data from plants and then try to destroy them to attain certain
goals. Furthermore, in order to increase the success ratio and enhance the covertness of attacks,
the adversary could randomly adopt any type of attacks at each time. On the other hand, it is
easy to find from (2) that the time interval (also called inter-event time) between adjacent event-
triggering instants is generally not a constant, which is determined by the event generator function
ψ. Therefore, the closed-loop system (5) cannot be regarded as a discrete-time expression with
constant sampling interval.
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Fig. 1. Attacks on an event-based control system.
Before proceeding further, we introduce the following definitions.
Definition 1. For a given positive scalar δ3 representing the desired security level, the set
D =
{
x˜0 ∈ Rnx : E||x˜k||2 ≤ δ23 , ∀k
}
(6)
is said to be the mean-square security domain of the origin of the closed-loop system (5).
Definition 2. Let R be a positive definite matrix and δ1, δ2, δ3 and δ4 be given constants. The
closed-loop system (5) is said to be secure with respect to (δ1, δ2, δ3, δ4, R) if, when ψ(ek, δ1) ≤ 0,
‖ξk‖ ≤ δ2 and x˜T0Rx˜0 ≤ δ24 , one has E||x˜k||2 ≤ δ23 for all k.
Remark 5. The five parameters δ1, δ2, δ3, δ4 and R do have their own engineering insights. To
be specific, δ1 is the triggering threshold that governs the transmission frequency for the benefit of
energy saving, δ2 is the energy bound for the false signals that the adversary likes to impose on the
measurement output from the attacked system, δ3 is associated with the desired security level (i.e.,
the upper bound for the dynamics evolution of the attached system in the mean square sense), δ4 is
about the energy of the initial system state andR is the weighting matrix for the initial system state.
Obviously, these five parameters play crucial roles for the system security performance evaluation
and design.
Our aim in this paper is to design an output feedback controller for system (5) with the event-
triggering communication mechanism and the randomly occurring cyber attacks. In other words,
we are going to determine the controller gain K such that the closed-loop system (5) is secure with
respect to (δ1, δ2, δ3, δ4, R).
3. Main Results
In this section, the security is analyzed for the closed-loop system (5) with the event-triggering
communication mechanism and the randomly occurring cyber attacks. A sufficient condition is
provided to guarantee that the closed-loop system (5) is secure with respect to (δ1, δ2, δ3, δ4, R).
Then, the explicit expression of the desired controller gain is proposed in terms of the solution to
certain matrix inequalities subject to nonlinear constraints.
Let us start with giving the following lemma that will be used in the proof of our main result in
this paper.
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Lemma 1. Given constant matrices Σ1, Σ2, Σ3, where Σ1 = ΣT1 and Σ2 = ΣT2 > 0. Then
Σ1 + Σ
T
3Σ
−1
2 Σ3 < 0 if and only if[
Σ1 Σ
T
3
Σ3 −Σ2
]
< 0 or
[ −Σ2 Σ3
ΣT3 Σ1
]
< 0.
Theorem 1. Let the positive scalars δ1, δ2, δ3, δ4, the positive definite matrix R and the controller
gain K be given. The closed-loop system (5) is secure with respect to (δ1, δ2, δ3, δ4, R) if there
exist two positive definite matrices P1 and P2, and three positive scalars ε1, ε2 and π satisfying the
following inequalities


Ξ1 =

 Ξ11 Ξ12 Ξ13∗ Ξ22 0
∗ ∗ Ξ33

 < 0 (7a)
Ξ2 = max
{λmax(PR)δ24
λmin(P )
,
θ2γ
λmin(P )(γ − 1)
}
≤ δ23 (7b)
where
A4 = diag
{ r∑
i=1
ATi P1Ai + α¯(1− β¯)
s∑
i=1
(
(BKCi)
TP1BKCi + C
T
i P2Ci
)
, 0
}
,
P = diag{P1, P2}, χ¯ = α˜β¯2 + β˜α¯2 + α˜β˜, θ =
√
ε1δ
2
1 + ε2δ
2
2,
Ξ11 = AT1 PA1 + α˜AT2PA2 − 2(α˜− α˜β¯)AT2 PA3
+ (α˜− 2α˜β¯ + χ¯)AT3PA3 +A4 − P + πI,
Ξ12 = α¯β¯AT1 PA5 − α˜β¯AT2 PA5 + (α˜β¯ − χ¯)AT3PA5,
Ξ13 = α¯(1− β¯)AT1PA5 − (α˜− α˜β¯)AT2 PA5 + (α˜− 2α˜β¯ + χ¯)AT3PA5,
Ξ22 = ((α¯β¯)
2 + χ¯)AT5PA5 − ε2I, Ξ23 = (α¯2β˜ + α˜β¯ − χ¯)AT5PA5
Ξ33 = (α¯
2(1− β¯)2 + α˜− 2α˜β¯ + χ¯)AT5 PA5 − ε1I, α˜ = α¯(1− α¯),
PR = R
−1/2PR−1/2, ρ = λmax(P ), γ =
ρ
ρ− π , β˜ = β¯(1− β¯).
Proof: See the Appendix.
Having obtained the analysis results, we are now in a position to handle the design problem of
the controller gain matrix K. First, in terms of Lemma 1 and the inequality
2(A2 −A3)TPA3 ≤ (A2 −A3)TP (A2 −A3) +AT3PA3,
(7a) is true if the following holds
Π1 =

 Π11 ∗ ∗Π¯12 −P¯−1 ∗
Π17 0 −I ⊗ P−11

 < 0 (8)
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where
B1 = [ A3 −A5 A5 ], B2 = [ A2 −A3 A5 A5 ],
S1 = diag{I, 0,−I}, S2 = diag{I,−I, I},
P¯ = diag
{
P, P, P, P, P}, Υ = [ CT1 CT2 · · · CTs ]T ,
Π00 =
r∑
i=1
ATi PAi + α¯(1− β¯)
s∑
i=1
CTi P2Ci − P1 + πI,
Π11 = diag
{
Π00,−P2 + πI, −ε2I, −ε1I
}
,
Π¯12 = [ Π
T
12 Π
T
13 Π
T
14 Π
T
15 Π
T
16 ]
T ,
Π12 = [ A1 α¯β¯A5 α¯(1− β¯)A5 ], Π13 =
√
χ¯B1,
Π14 =
√
α˜B2S1, Π15 =
√
α˜β¯B2S2, Π16 =
√
α˜β¯B1S1,
Π17 =
[ √
α¯(1− β¯)(I ⊗BK)Υ 0 0 0
]
.
In what follows, we introduce a free matrix
Θ =
[
Θ11 Θ12
0 Θ22
]
and denote
W =[ B((BTB)−1)T B⊥ ]T ,
K¯ =Θ11K, K = [K¯T 0]T ,
Γ =ΘW +W TΘT − P1, Ψ = ΘWP−11 W TΘT ,
where Θ11 ∈ Rnx×p, Θ12 ∈ Rnx×(nx−p) and Θ22 ∈ R(nx−p)×(nx−p), B⊥ stands for an orthogonal
basis of the null space for BT .
Pre- and post-multiplying the inequality (8) by
diag{I, I5 ⊗ diag{ΘW,P2}, I ⊗ (ΘW )}
and
diag{I, I5 ⊗ diag{(ΘW )T , P2}, I ⊗ (ΘW )T}
yields
Π2 =

 Π11 ∗ ∗Π˜∗12 −I5 ⊗ diag{Ψ, P2} ∗
Π˜17 0 −I ⊗Ψ

 ≤ 0 (9)
where
B˜1 =
[ KC0 0 −K K
P2C0 0 −P2 P2
]
, B˜2 =
[ −KC0 K K K
−P2C0 P2 P2 P2
]
,
Π˜12 =
[
ΘWA0 + α¯(1− β¯)KC0 (1− α¯)K α¯β¯K α¯(1− β¯)K
α¯(1− β¯)P2C0 (1− α¯)P2 α¯β¯P2 α¯(1− β¯)P2
]
,
Π˜13 =
√
χ¯B˜1, Π˜14 =
√
α˜B˜2S1, Π˜15 =
√
α˜β¯B˜2S2,
Π˜16 =
√
α˜β¯B˜2S2, Π˜17 =
[ √
α¯(1− β¯)(I ⊗K)Υ 0 0 0
]
,
Π˜∗12 = [ Π˜
T
12 Π˜
T
13 Π˜
T
14 Π˜
T
15 Π˜
T
16 ]
T .
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It is apparent from (9) that
Π2 =

 Π11 ∗ ∗Π˜∗12 −I5 ⊗ diag{Γ, P2} ∗
Π˜17 0 −I ⊗ Γ


+ diag
{
0, I5 ⊗ diag{Γ−Ψ, 0}, I ⊗ (Γ−Ψ)
}
.
(10)
Finally, in light of
ΘW + (ΘW )T −ΘWP1(ΘW )T − P1
= − (P1 −ΘW )P1(P1 −ΘW )T ≤ 0,
one has
Π2 ≤ Π3 :=

 Π11 ∗ ∗Π˜∗12 −I5 ⊗ diag{Γ, P2} ∗
Π˜17 0 −I ⊗ Γ

 . (11)
It should be pointed out that the matrix ΘW is invertible if Π2 ≤ Π3 < 0. It can be seen that
Π2 < 0 is equivalent to (8), and therefore Π2 < 0 is equivalent to (7a) in Theorem 1. Finally, ac-
cording to the analysis conducted above, the following theorem is easily accessible from Theorem
1 and its proof is therefore omitted.
Theorem 2. Let the positive scalars δ1, δ2, δ3, δ4 and the positive definite matrix R be given. As-
sume that there exist two positive definite matrices P1 and P2, two matrices Θ and K¯ and three
positive scalars ε1, ε2 and π satisfying the matrix inequalities Π3 < 0, and the condition (7b). In
this case, with the controller gain matrix given by
K = Θ−111 K¯
the closed-loop system (5) is secure with respect to (δ1, δ2, δ3, δ4, R).
Algorithm:
Step 1. Denote a positive scalar τ for linearly searching step size.
Step 2. Let π = 0 and then check the solvability of inequality (7a). If it is
solvable, go to next step, else go to Step 6.
Step 3. Let π = π + τ , solve the following optimal problem:
OP : min
pi,ρ˜max
ρ˜max + ε1 + ε2 s. t. (7a) and P < ρ˜maxI.
Step 4. If the optimal problem OP is solvable, calculate ρ, γ, λmax(PR),
λmin(P ) and θ2. In what follows, obtain Ξ2 and go to the next step.
If it is not solvable, go to Step 6.
Step 5. Check the condition (7b). If Ξ2 ≤ δ23 , K = Θ−111 K¯ is the desired
controller gain, the calculation stops. Else go to Step 3.
Step 6. The algorithm is infeasible. Stop.
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In the case that the threshold δ1 = 0, it is not difficult to see that the triggering rules are always
fulfilled, that is, the event-based approach reduces to a time-driven one. Consequently, we have
the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Let the positive scalars δ2, δ3, δ4 and the positive definite matrix R be given. Assume
that there exist two positive definite matrices P1 and P2,, two matrices Θ and K¯ and two positive
scalars ε1 and π satisfying the following inequalities


Ξ3 =

 Ξ
∗
11 ∗ ∗
Ξ˜∗12 −I5 ⊗ Γ¯ ∗
Ξ∗17 0 −I ⊗ Γ

 < 0 (12a)
Ξ4 = max
{λmax(PR)δ24
λmin(P )
,
θ2γ
λmin(P )(γ − 1)
}
≤ δ23 (12b)
where
B¯1 =
[ KC0 0 −K
P2C0 0 −P2
]
, B¯2 =
[ −KC0 K K
−P2C0 P2 P2
]
,
Ξ∗11 = diag
{
Π00,−P2 + πI, −ε1I
}
, θ =
√
ε1δ2,
Ξ∗12 =
[
ΘWA0 + α¯(1− β¯)KC0 (1− α¯)K α¯β¯K
α¯(1− β¯)P2C0 (1− α¯)P2 α¯β¯P2
]
,
Ξ∗13 =
√
χ¯B¯1, Ξ∗14 =
√
α˜B¯2S¯1, Ξ∗15 =
√
α˜β¯B¯2S¯2,
Ξ∗16 =
√
α˜β¯B¯1S¯1, Π∗17 =
[ √
α¯(1− β¯)(I ⊗K)Υ 0 0
]
,
Ξ˜∗12 = [ Ξ
∗T
12 Ξ
∗
13T Ξ
∗T
14 Ξ
∗T
15 Ξ
∗T
16 ]
T ,
S¯1 = diag{I, 0}, S¯2 = diag{−I, I}.
In this case, with the controller gain matrix given by K = Θ−111 K¯, the closed-loop system (5) is
secure with respect to (0, δ2, δ3, δ4, R).
Remark 6. In this paper, the event-based security control problem is investigated for a class of
discrete-time stochastic systems with multiplicative noises and cyber attacks. By utilizing two
sets of Bernoulli distributed white sequences, a novel attack model is proposed to account for the
phenomenon of both randomly occurring DoS attacks and randomly occurring deception attacks.
Based on such a model, the result established in Theorem 2 contains all the information about
the threshold of the event-triggered communication mechanism, the security requirements and the
statistical information of cyber attacks. It is worth mentioning that the research methodology
developed in this paper is quite general that can be applied to a variety of systems. For example,
the obtained results can been easily extended to more complicated cases such as the case where
the attacks occur in the channel between controllers and physical systems as well as the channel
between sensors and controllers.
4. Illustrative example
Following [37], we consider the security control problem for a geared DC motor, which is a com-
ponent of the MS150 modular servo system. Setting the sampling time T = 0.01s, we obtain the
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following discretized nominal system matrix and measurement matrix:
A0 =
[
1 0.0098
0 0.9653
]
, C0 =
[
1
0
]T
.
In the MS150 modular servo system, the control input uk is a voltage and the measurement output
y˜k is a rotary angle of the extended shaft, which is also called the position of the shaft. The
movement of the motor is affected by the stochastic disturbance ωi,k (i = 1). To this end, other
parameters are given as
A1 =
[
0.0120 0
0 0.0900
]
,
B =
[
1.50
0.01
]
, C1 =
[
0.12
−0.14
]T
.
Assume that the attack probabilities are α¯ = 0.90 and β¯ = 0.25. Moreover, the parameters δ1,
δ2, δ3, δ4 and R are, respectively, 0.004, 0.10, 0.32, 0.30 and diag{0.95, 0.95}.
By using the Matlab software (with the YALMIP 3.0 [38]) where the solver is selected as
’solvesdp’, a set of feasible solutions of Theorem 2 is obtained as follows:
ε1 = 24.8338, ε2 = 22.3623, π = 0.4044, K¯ = −5.6703, P2 = 5.0861
P1 =
[
9.6681 −0.1235
−0.1235 9.9088
]
,Θ =
[
15.6750 0.3023
0 −16.5272
]
.
Furthermore, the desired control parameter is obtained as K = −0.3617.
In the simulation, the disturbance signal of attackers ξtk is selected as δ2 sin(k) and the initial
value is set as x0 = [0.20 − 0.18]T . The simulation results are shown in Figs. 2-4, where Fig. 2
plots the norm of states for the open-loop system and the closed-loop system without attacks. Since
the spectral radius of the matrix A0⊗A0 +
∑p
i=1Ai⊗Ai is 1.0015, we can see that the open-loop
system is unstable.
Fig. 3 depicts the norm of states for the closed-loop system with attacks. The curve experiences
three unexpected jumps at k = 75, 78, 81 and 114 since the system suffers from deception attacks
at k = 73, 74, 77, 80 and 113. In comparison with the dotted line in Fig. 2, the control performance
is degraded by attacks.
The event-triggered time and the successful time of attacks are shown in Fig. 4, from which we
can easily find that the number of event-triggered communication is quite small and the communi-
cation burden is effectively reduced. In Table 1 and Table 2, we further examine the effect on the
security level from the increased attack probability of DoS attacks (or deception attacks) and we
can conclude that the security performance deteriorates as the attack probability increases.
Table 1 The minimum security level with different 1− α¯ for β¯ = 0.001
1− α¯ 0.380 0.385 0.390 0.395 0.400 0.405 0.410
Security level δ2
3
0.5899 0.6065 0.6254 0.6457 0.6680 0.6937 0.7213
1− α¯ 0.415 0.420 0.425 0.430 0.435 0.440 0.445
Security level δ2
3
0.753 0.7894 0.8305 0.8784 0.9359 1.0034 1.0851
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Fig. 2. The norm of states for the open-loop system and the closed-loop system without attacks.
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Fig. 3. The norm of states for the closed-loop system with attacks.
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Table 2 The minimum security level with different β¯ for α¯ = 0.999
β¯ 0.26 0.29 0.32 0.35 0.38 0.41 0.44
Security level δ2
3
1.8650 1.8664 1.8676 1.8686 1.8716 1.8743 1.8778
β¯ 0.47 0.50 0.53 0.56 0.59 0.62 0.65
Security level δ2
3
1.8842 1.8905 1.8990 1.9093 1.9221 1.9395 2.1790
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Fig. 4. The event-triggered time and the attack time
5. Conclusion
In this paper, the event-based security control problem has been discussed for a class of discrete-
time stochastic systems with multiplicative noises. The plant under consideration is subject to
randomly occurring DoS attacks and randomly occurring deception attacks. First, a novel attack
model has been provided to describe such two attacks within a unified framework. Then, an event-
based communication mechanism has been utilized to reduce the communication burden. Fur-
thermore, the output feedback controller gain matrix has been obtained by solving a linear matrix
inequality with nonlinear constraints. Finally, a simulation example has been exploited to show the
effectiveness of the event-triggered security control scheme proposed in this paper.
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Appendix: Proof of Theorem 1
Construct the Lyapunov function
Vk = x˜
T
k P x˜k.
By calculating the difference of Vk along the trajectory of system (5) and taking the mathematical
expectation on ωi,k, ̟j,k (i = 1, 2, · · · , r, j = 1, 2, · · · , s), αtks and βtks , one has
E{∆Vk|x˜k} = E
{
x˜Tk+1P x˜k+1 − x˜Tk P x˜k|x˜k
}
= E
{
E
{
x˜Tk+1P x˜k+1 − x˜Tk P x˜k
∣∣αtks , βtks}
∣∣∣x˜k
}
= E
{
x˜Tk
(
AT1PA1 + α˜AT2PA2 − 2(α˜− α˜β¯)AT2PA3
+ (α˜− 2α˜β¯ + χ¯)AT3PA3 +A4 − P
)
x˜k
+ x˜Tk
(
2α¯β¯AT1 PA5 − 2α˜β¯AT2 PA5 + 2(α˜β¯ − χ¯)AT3 PA5
)
ξtks
+ x˜Tk
(
2α¯(1− β¯)AT1PA5 − 2(α˜− α˜β¯)AT2PA5
+ 2(α˜− 2α˜β¯ + χ¯)AT3PA5
)
ek + (ξ
t
ks)
T
(
((α¯β¯)2 + χ¯)AT5 PA5
)
ξtks
+ 2(ξtks)
T
(
(α¯2β˜ + α˜β¯ − χ¯)AT5 PA5
)
ek
+ eTk
(
(α¯2(1− β¯)2 + α˜− 2α˜β¯ + χ¯)AT5 PA5
)
ek
∣∣∣x˜k
}
= ηTk Ξ˜ηk
(13)
where
ηk = [ x˜
T
k (ξ
t
ks
)T eTk ]
T ,
Ξ˜ =

 Ξ11 − πI Ξ12 Ξ13∗ Ξ22 + ε2I 0
∗ ∗ Ξ33 + ε1I

 .
Subsequently, taking ψ(ek, δ1) ≤ 0 and ‖ξtk‖ ≤ δ2 into consideration, one has
E{∆V (k)}
≤ E{ηTk Ξ˜ηk + ε1(δ21 − eTk ek) + ε2(δ22 − (ξtks)T ξtks)}
= E
{
ηTk Ξ1ηk − ηTk diag{πI, 0, 0}ηk
}
+ ε1δ
2
1 + ε2δ
2
2
≤ − E{ηTk diag{πI, 0, 0}ηk} + θ2
(14)
which implies
E{∆Vk} ≤ −πE{‖x˜k‖2}+ θ2. (15)
For any scalar γ > 1, it follows from the above inequality that
E{γk+1Vk+1} − E{γkVk}
= γk+1E{Vk+1 − Vk}+ γk(γ − 1)E{Vk}
≤ γk((γ − 1)ρ− γπ)E{‖x˜k‖2}+ γk+1θ2.
(16)
Selecting γ = ρ
ρ−pi
and one has from (16) that
E{γkVk} − E{V0} ≤ (γk + γk−1 + · · ·+ γ)θ2 (17)
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which implies
E{Vk} ≤ γ−kE{V0}+ (1 + γ−1 + · · ·+ γ−k+1)θ2
= γ−kE{V0}+ [1− (1/γ)
k]θ2
1− 1/γ
= γ−k
[
E{V0} − θ
2γ
γ − 1
]
+
θ2γ
γ − 1
≤ γ−k
(
λmax(R
−1/2PR−1/2)δ24 −
θ2γ
γ − 1
)
+
θ2γ
γ − 1
≤ max
{
λmax(R
−1/2PR−1/2)δ24,
θ2γ
γ − 1
}
.
(18)
Finally, it can be concluded from (7b) that the closed-loop system (5) is secure with respect to
(δ1, δ2, δ3, δ4, R), which completes the proof.
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